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ABSTRACT: Culture is critical to just about every area of society and especially law. The right 
to culture is meant to secure individual access to the cultural framework dominating the public 
institutions that have the authority to deliberate, interpret, and enforce human rights law. This is 
made possible through the acquisition of the suitable “cultural equipment” mentioned in the first 
part of the paper. Such acquisition is a prerequisite for the exercise of the right to cultural 
participation as well as a range of other individual rights and freedoms similarly recognized in 
human rights law, From this viewpoint, the aim of the article is to focus on the concept of culture 
and its place in human rights law. This interdisciplinary theoretical understanding of the concept 
of “culture” serves to redirect attention towards a range of issues that have long been 
marginalized, but which warrant culture a central place in human rights research and on the 
international human rights agenda. As a consequence, the main argument developed throughout 
the paper consists in a summon for the human rights agenda on culture to reaffirm the universal 
and overarching importance of culture in advancing respect for human rights and to seek to 
rebalance the present agenda dominated by a right to cultural identity with an urgent emphasis on 
the fundamental importance of“Cultural equipment” and cultural infrastructure for individual 
freedom. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Talk of culture in human rights and diplomatic 
circles emerged at the beginning of the 1990s in 
reaction to three rather different events: the ethnic 
revivals in post-communist politics with their 
corollary demands for national independence and 
self-determination, the partial success of 
indigenous people in establishing their own distinct 
human rights agenda1, as well as the criticism of 
the claim about the universal validity of human 
rights advanced in the World Conference on 
Human Rights in Vienna in 1993 and reflected – at 
least to some extent – in its concluding document.2 
While these events evidently boosted a sense of 
urgency to give culture a firm place in human 
rights research, it must be noted that the issue of 
culture was not novel, but had surfaced already at 
the time of the adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.3 At that 
time, however, the cultural critique came from 
academic circles and was most forcefully expressed 
in the “American Anthropological Statement” 
submitted to the drafters of the Declaration. The 
American anthropologists underlined a series of 
principles as being crucial: 
Culture is the path for an individual to develop his 
personality and for this reason respect for 
individual differences involves a respect for 
cultural differences;  
The scientific fact that no technique of qualitatively 
evaluating cultures has been discovered validates 
the “respect for differences between cultures” 
thesis;  
Standards and values are relative to the culture 
from which they derive so that any attempt to 
formulate postulates that grow out of the beliefs or 
moral codes of one culture must to that extent 
detract from the applicability of any Declaration of 
Human Rights to mankind as a whole.4  
Nonetheless, as the pressing purpose of the 
Declaration was to condemn the atrocities of the 
Second World War, the somewhat abstract and 
haughty propositions about the tie between 
individual human beings and particular cultures 
listed in the anthropologists‟ statement did not 
receive much attention and when it did, the final 
inclusion of a provision on culture was motivated 
by a proclaimed importance of individual 
participation in the cultural life of the community.5 
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, a number of culture-related 
interests and concerns have been introduced and 
incorporated into the fabric of international human 
rights law. 
For this reason, the aim of the paper consists in 
examining the relationship between culture and 
respect for human rights, revealing culture as a 
quality possessed by the individual with a serious 
impact on its ability to enjoy the rights and 
freedoms as recognized in international human 
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rights law in meaningful and effective ways. This 
understanding serves to redirect attention towards a 
range of issues that have long been marginalized, 
but which warrant culture a central place in human 
rights research and on the international human 
rights agenda. 
Interdisciplinary theoretical approaches on 
(legal) culture 
The claim about the critical role and significance of 
culture in human action is familiar to social 
theorists and anthropologists, being known as the 
„subjective-behavioral‟ approach that understands 
culture, “not merely as an inner state (feelings and 
experience), but also as a vehicle for commitments, 
utterances, and actions.” 6 Moreover, it is consented 
that the individual’s cultural resources – language 
and other skills (cultivated through education and 
training), informal know-how, familiarity with 
local habits, styles, and customs – reflect whether a 
person is sufficiently equipped in cultural terms to 
enjoy and exercise fully his or her agency and 
freedom. As Ann Swindler states: 
“Culture shapes action, not by providing ultimate 
ends, but by providing a repertoire or tool-kit of 
habits, skills and styles from which people 
construct strategies of action. It consists of 
symbolic vehicles of meaning, including beliefs, 
ritual practices, art forms, and ceremonies, as well 
as informal cultural practices such as language, 
gossip, stories, and rituals of daily life.”7 
It is generally considered that, from a legal 
perspective, culture is first and foremost a “quality 
possessed by the individual that directly influences 
the ability to enjoy the rights and freedoms as 
recognized in international human rights law in 
effective and meaningful ways.”8 In this line of 
thought, Jessica Almqvist notes in Human Rights, 
Culture, and the 
Rule of Law that the cultural dimension of the 
individual is represented by three elements: skills 
(cultural equipment); cultural norms (adiaphora); 
and ideology (comprehensive doctrine). 
The skills, norms, and ideological outlook which 
together constitute the cultural dimension of the 
individual are generally understood as the product 
of membership in society. And from this angle, the 
cultural dimension is primarily acquired and 
learned. One classic definition of culture was 
provided by Edward Tylor in 1871 considering it as 
being “that complex whole which includes 
knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and 
any other capabilities and habits acquired by man 
as a member of society.”11 
In addition to being acquired and learned, culture is 
also generally understood as fabricated and not 
“natural”.13 Culture is first and foremost a quality 
possessed by individuals but organizations (public 
and private, social, political, and legal) also have 
cultural dimensions that might not always coincide 
with the individual dimension; whether people are 
able to make effective use of their rights in a 
significant way depends a great deal upon the 
character of the social environment as well as the 
culture in use by the public institutions in their 
place of residence, work, and life. Another words, 
the notions of “public culture” and “social culture” 
capture two main types of culture that the 
individual is related to besides his own culture. 
According to Rawls, “social culture”, also called 
the “background culture” of civil society, refers to 
the “culture of daily life, of its many associations, 
churches, universities, learned and scientific 
societies, and clubs and teams”; “public political 
culture”, in contrast, comprises the political 
institutions of a constitutional regime and the 
public traditions of their interpretation (including 
those of the judiciary), as well as historic texts and 
documents that are common knowledge.14 
What is relevant for us is that the individual’s 
culture may correlate with the social and public 
cultures, but the different cultures may also diverge 
in the sense that the individual does not possess the 
skills, observe the cultural norms, or affirm the 
ideological outlook currently dominating public 
and social institutions in society. 
John Merryman long ago reminded us that 
historically rooted attitudes about law link the legal 
system to general culture.15 Furthermore, 
globalization and especially Europeanization has 
increased interaction between different levels of 
society and different countries, contributing either 
to convergence or to the divergence of law, 
affecting the formation and evolution of different 
legal cultures. From this viewpoint, in an article 
about modern legal culture, Friedman calls our 
time an “age of convergence in legal cultures”. 
Exploring six traits: change of society, density of 
law, instrumentality of law, position of 
fundamental rights, individualism and 
globalization, traits that link together variables of 
modern legal culture and shape modern legal 
systems, Friedman argues that greater 
interdependence on different levels, similar 
developments of industrial countries and similar 
demands of society have as a result in (public) 
attitudes towards law becoming alike.16 
Along the years, several definitions of legal culture 
have been developed. Blankenburg, for example, 
employs the concept of legal culture explaining 
where, why and when people use legal institutions, 
and how those institutions – a key element in legal 
culture – differ in societies.17 Tuori takes a multi-
layered approach towards legal culture. He 
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distinguishes the “surface level”, “national legal 
culture” and “deep structures of law”.18 In his view, 
written laws are at the surface, like the visible lawn 
within a country. Underneath this lawn, and 
necessary for the lawn to grow and flourish, is the 
national legal culture. National legal culture thus 
functions as nutrition for written law; what he calls 
the “deep structures of law” are basic concepts of 
law, shared by many countries, like wells 
underneath the nutritious soil that contribute to the 
growing of the grass (in his metaphor, written law). 
Legrand focuses on the specific role of legal 
professionals and their mindset (what he calls 
mentalité) to define legal culture19, arguing that 
legal culture is the main source of division among 
legal systems in Europe. Instead of convergence of 
law, he claims, common and civil law will remain 
divided by an “irreducible chasm”, as a British 
lawyer will never be fully able to step into the 
shoes of his German colleague because he will 
inevitably think differently than a German lawyer. 
20 
The definition of legal culture formulated by 
Friedman entails better the general goal of our 
study, which is to reveal several understandings of 
the relationship between culture and human rights. 
Defining legal culture as “ideas, values, 
expectations and attitudes towards law and legal 
institutions, which some public or some parts of the 
public holds” 21 , Friedman distinguishes between 
an internal and an external legal culture; while “the 
external legal culture is the legal culture of the 
general population; the internal legal culture is the 
legal culture of those members of society who 
perform specialized legal tasks.” 22 The external 
legal culture is therefore a term describing public 
knowledge about law and attitudes towards a legal 
system.23 In reference to internal legal culture, it 
has been said that “[a] specially important kind of 
group legal culture is that of legal professionals – 
the values, ideologies, and principles of lawyers, 
judges, and others working within the magic circle 
of the legal system”24. 
Legal culture, as Friedman defined it, has proven to 
be a useful concept. However, the concept also has 
its critics. Some feel that the concept is too general 
and focuses too little on law. Cotterrell criticises 
the concept as too broad and not substantive 
enough for scholarly use.25 to him, the study of 
legal culture in terms of ideas, values and attitudes 
of a specific group of people is too broad to 
distinguish it from general culture. 
A human rights approach to culture 
The human rights culture is located in the 
framework of a legal culture, which in its turn “fits 
into the broader framework of a political culture 
and the even broader framework of the dialectic 
between opinion formation and will formation in a 
deliberative democracy”27. As such, in every 
deliberative democracy and not only, a human 
rights culture merits a distinctive and, in a sense, 
primary place. For that reason, the next section of 
our article is structured in three parts. After 
locating the human rights culture in the broader 
framework of the legal culture, we explore what a 
human rights culture implies. That is not easy, 
since the term is used in the literature with hardly 
any definition or explanation, seeming more “like 
an appellative image than a concept with a properly 
defined meaning, which should fit and play its 
role.”28 
In a speech entitled “The right to peace” in 1997 
the secretary-general of UNESCO sketched an 
evocative picture of what we call a human rights 
culture: 
The principle of publicity (French: publicité; 
German: Öffentlichkeit), in the sense that the 
discourse is not hidden, isolated, private, but a 
topic of shared concern, to which all human beings, 
all members of all ethnic groups, all citizens have 
access and in which all can participate actively.  
Secondly, because of the principle of publicity, the 
arena of the human rights culture must be the 
“marketplace”, “the public sphere”, which includes 
the public that actively participates and the 
audience that engages in it. As the authors notice 
“the marketplace nowadays is to be found in the 
mass media, especially the press (including opinion 
or forum pages) and radio and TV programs 
(including discussion and interactive programs)”.  
The object of a human rights culture in principle 
comprises two sorts of topics, namely problems 
and conflicts, raised by any individual, group or 
community for whom a public can be found. While 
human rights problems refer to concrete situations 
that call for the application of human rights, to 
which end their meaning and scope have to be 
clarified, usually, however, the object of a human 
rights culture is a matter of human rights conflicts, 
that is “conflict arising from a clash of human 
rights, the resolution of which is assessed and 
regarded differently by individuals and groups”.35  
A necessary condition for a reflective human rights 
culture, whose aspects of analysis, evaluation and 
synthesis we have indicated and whose principle, 
arena, object and aim we have described, is the 
formation of attitudes towards human rights. This 
is a necessary rather than a sufficient condition, for 
neither “a long tradition of individual liberties (as 
in France), nor even a deep public „internalization‟ 
of civil rights expectations (as in Britain), is a 
sufficient guarantee against the non-enforcement or 
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erosion of civil rights”. Yet, as a necessary 
condition, human rights attitudes are vitally 
important. If human rights are not Rooted in a 
positive attitude, a positive mind-set, positive 
engagement on the part of those who have to 
realise a human rights culture, then the entire 
culture of critical reflection that forms the core of it 
is illusory. 
As the dominant approach in human rights law 
links culture mainly to communities and the 
development of a right to cultural identity, we 
consider that the idea of a right to culture has not 
been subjected to sufficiently rigorous scrutiny and 
some inherited positions need to be questioned. For 
this reason, the aim of this section is to focus on the 
concept of culture and its place in human rights 
law. Furthermore we argue that the issue of culture 
cannot be treated in an isolated manner, but is 
critical to just about every area of human rights and 
that a closer inspection of human rights law reveals 
several understandings of the relationship between 
culture and human rights. 
Annotations on the right to culture 
As noted in the volume Human Rights, Culture, 
and the Rule of Law, culture is “something that one 
can have a right to in the same way as one has a 
right to housing, clean water, or nutrition.”36 For 
example, in a recent UNESCO report, the right to 
culture is presented as a right to a way of life, and 
cultural freedom as a collective freedom, referring 
to the right of a group or people to follow a way of 
its choice.”37 
In a similar vein, the drafters of the European 
Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities assert that the purpose of the 
right to culture is to protect aspirations shared by 
the members of a national minority “to develop 
their culture, and to preserve the essential elements 
of their identity, namely their religion, language, 
traditions and cultural heritage.”38 
Among academics as well as professionals, a 
fundamental and radical disagreement persists not 
only as to what actions a right to culture may 
legitimise, but also about the ultimate purpose for 
which we want and need that right. For this reason, 
we believe that it is timely to redirect attention to 
culture when thinking about rights and justice, 
especially because the idea of a right to culture in 
its current formulation finds support among 
contemporary philosophers. 
For example, Will Kymlicka considers that the 
struggle for recognition of culture has been 
successful insofar as it has led to “a growing 
awareness of the importance of interests in 
recognition, identity, language, and cultural 
membership, usually ignored by liberal theorists of 
justice.”39 Several philosophers argue that a right to 
culture really captures a set of new interests and 
concerns which are not well understood within the 
Rule of Law or the distributive paradigm. In 
Charles Taylor‟s view, such a right is supposed to 
protect the necessary conditions for identity-
formation, the integrity or survival of the nation 
since “each of us depends on our national 
membership to enable us to develop a sense of 
identity.”40 Also, more liberal interpretations of 
culture tend to be inspired by the nation. If pressed 
on the question of the nature of the social 
environment believed to be conducive for rights-
use, liberal philosophers tend to look to the nation 
with its shared language and institutional 
arrangements.41 It is in this spirit that Kymlicka 
develops his argument about the (liberal) nation as 
a “context of choice” or a “cultural structure” 
which is of fundamental importance for making 
intelligent judgments about the things we want to 
be and do in life. The national culture is the 
background condition crucial for the enjoyment of 
agency and freedom. As Kymlicka writes: 
“Our language and history are the media through 
which we come to an awareness of the options 
available to us, and their significance; and this is a 
precondition of making intelligent judgments about 
how to lead our lives. We make judgments by 
examining the cultural structure. What follows 
from this? Liberals should be concerned with the 
fate of cultural structures, not because they have 
some moral status of their own, but because it‟s 
only through having a rich and secure cultural 
structure that people can become aware, in a vivid 
way, of the options available to them, and 
intelligently examine their value.”42 
Moreover, from a legal perspective, a number of 
culture-related interests and concerns have been 
gradually introduced and incorporated into the 
fabric of human rights law. For example, the idea 
of a right to culture as an individual right to take 
part in cultural life which was recognised for the 
first time in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights has been reaffirmed several times in 
international instruments as a right to take part in 
cultural life, as a right to equal enjoyment and 
participation in cultural activities or as a right of 
children to participate freely in cultural life and the 
arts. 43 
Nonetheless, given its historical significance and its 
multiple affirmations in international human rights 
law44, surprisingly little interest has been awarded 
to the meaning of the right to cultural participation 
in comparison with other cultural rights. For 
example, when commenting on Article 15(1)(a) of 
the ICESCR, the UN Economic, Social and 
Cultural Committee only notes that the term 
„culture‟ should be given a wide reading, but 
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refrains from any definition. It holds that even if 
culture may not seem to be a matter of human 
rights, it is of fundamental importance to the 
principle of equality of treatment, freedom of 
expression, the right to receive and impart 
information, and the right to the full development 
of human personality.45 However, it avoids 
engaging in any explanation of how the right to 
cultural participation is related to any of these 
rights. As Jessica Almqvist notes, when addressing 
the challenges posed by globalization on the 
advancement of human rights, the contributions of 
the committee centre on the impact of these 
challenges on the protection of economic and social 
rights, “hardly any attention being given to the 
impact of globalization processes on the right to 
culture”46. 
The modest attention paid to the right to culture as 
a right to cultural participation should be contrasted 
with the right to enjoy one’s own culture. The latter 
right has been intensively debated from the 
standpoint of a diversity of different groups, such 
as peoples, as well as national, ethnic, linguistic, 
and religious minorities, including migrant workers 
and indigenous people as well as minority children. 
What is more, since its affirmation in international 
human rights law, the right has come to comprise a 
diversity of more specific rights, including the right 
to cultural development, the right to cultural 
identity and, occasionally, the right to cultural 
integrity. 
The idea of a human right to culture as connoting 
something like a right of a community to enjoy its 
own culture was launched for the first time in the 
context of self-determination rights and minority 
rights in 1966. In the context of self-determination, 
the right is essentially understood as a right of 
peoples to develop their cultures. Thus, according 
to Article 1(1) of both the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
ICESCR “all peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.” 
The World Commission on Culture and 
Development (UNESCO) has sought to endow the 
right to cultural development with meaning and 
significance. According to its findings, culture not 
only has an instrumental function in development, 
but is also a desirable end in itself, insofar as it 
gives meaning to our existence. 47 Nevertheless, 
given its broad mandate to explore the relationship 
between culture and development, it fails to 
advance any meaningful definition of the right to 
cultural development as such.48 
To sum up, the idea of a right to culture as a right 
to enjoy one‟s own culture, in particular, in the 
form of a right to cultural identity, is gaining 
momentum in human rights law, both in the form 
of the adoption of new instruments as well as in 
jurisprudence, in particular, as a right designed to 
protect certain minority cultures, notably 
indigenous peoples. In the absence of any critical 
account of the way in which the right to cultural 
identity is related to other human rights, such as the 
right to cultural participation, the dominant 
understanding of what the right to culture consists 
of in more concrete terms and to whom it applies is 
likely to remain unchallenged. 
The idea of a right to culture as a right of certain 
minorities, in particular, national minorities and 
indigenous peoples, to develop and preserve their 
cultural identities is gaining momentum at the 
expense of other cultural rights, notably the right to 
cultural participation. The modest attention paid to 
cultural rights by the various international human 
rights institutions mandated to expound the content 
and significance of those rights reinforces a deep-
rooted sentiment about the irrelevance or 
superfluity of cultural rights. 
In a nutshell, culture is depicted not merely as 
something that everybody has a right to participate 
in, but also as hampering and debilitating, possibly 
violating the right to enjoy the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed in international human rights law. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that culture has received 
attention in the human rights context, it is mainly 
perceived as referring to community and as 
warranting the strengthening of the right to enjoy 
one‟s own culture or community by recognising a 
right to cultural identity. Other notions of culture 
and their significance to the advancement of human 
rights are left in the background. 
Taking into consideration all these aspects, the 
current paper does not support the introduction of 
new or additional rights, but a more detailed 
account of the meaning of the existing rights and 
their relationship to the cultural dimension of the 
individual; furthermore, we articulate the ultimate 
purpose for which everybody needs and wants a 
right to culture, namely to enjoy individual 
freedom, considering that this is the rationale that 
must shape and inform the core content of an 
international human rights agenda on culture. 
Conclusion 
Concepts such as human rights culture, legal 
culture, political culture, civil culture and 
deliberative democracy do not refer to stable 
phenomena, unalterable products, an invariable 
status quo, but to an ever changing project, aimed 
at an ever changing process with variable input and 
output that will never have final substance, form or 
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results but will always be subject to constantly 
changing perspectives and critical reflection. 
First of all,. In other words, suitable cultural 
equipment is not an end in itself, but is essential to 
the effective enjoyment of international human 
rights in general. A focus on culture directs 
attention to the fundamental importance of 
possessing the set of tools, skills, and know-how 
necessary to access laws and legal institutions as 
well as for participating in economic and political 
life. 
As societies become increasingly diversified in 
cultural terms, several issues gain critical 
importance for the aim of securing effective and 
adequate protection of individual freedom. To this 
end, the paper has addressed questions regarding 
legal culture and the role of individual culture in 
the human rights area. From this viewpoint, the 
main conclusion of the study is that human rights 
agenda on culture must reaffirm the universal and 
overarching importance of culture in advancing 
respect for human rights and seek to rebalance the 
present agenda dominated by a right to cultural 
identity with an urgent emphasis on the 
fundamental importance of “cultural equipment” 
and cultural infrastructure to individual freedom, as 
well as the need to address and specify the absolute 
limits to cultural difference. In so doing, the 
international human rights community is more 
likely to achieve its objective of securing a 
universal minimum provision of respect for 
persons. 
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